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TALES OF A FOURTH TIER NOTHING, A RESPONSE TO BRIAN
TAMANAHA’S FAILING LAW SCHOOLS
Lucille A. Jewel

This is a paper written in response to Professor Brian Tamanaha’s
Failing Law Schools. Much of the book is laudable for highlighting the
serious structural, policy, and moral issues confronting legal education
today. However, I disagree with several of Professor Tamanaha’s ideas
for reforming our system. In this paper, I write from the perspective of a
tenured legal writing professor teaching at a for-profit fourth tier school,
in fact, one of the schools that Professor Tamanaha repeatedly implies are
the problem and not the solution for the legal education crisis.
Part One addresses the idea, which dates back to 1921, that students at
lower-tiered schools should be able to receive a different education
(impliedly lower quality) than those students matriculating at higher
ranked schools. Part Two counters Professor Tamanaha’s dichotomous
view of legal scholarship and teaching, arguing that scholarship and legal
theory carry a unique practical value for students, particularly in the
context of a non-elite legal education. Part Three considers Professor
Tamanaha’s puzzling claim that clinical faculty and legal writing faculty
must accept less job security and unequal pay in order to help save legal
education.
Part Four of this paper presents an alternative explanation as to why
students might choose to attend law school, even with the deep economic
hardships involved. In terms of the continuing value of the J.D. degree,
both Professor Tamanaha’s narrow economic analysis and the
predominant counterarguments (e.g., you can do anything with a law
degree!) miss the point that, for many, a law degree carries cultural value
that operates apart (but sometimes in tandem) with economic capital. The
idea that we should impose restraints on the ability of students to obtain a
law degree, if they so choose, is somewhat paternalistic and at odds with
the free market aspects of his analysis. The paper concludes by briefly
developing social policy arguments that explain why we must work on
 Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. For nine years prior to my
appointment at the University of Tennessee, I taught legal writing and legal skills courses at Atlanta’s
John Marshall Law School.
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reducing the institutionalized elitism that afflicts the legal profession and
its educational system. Legal education must be reformed. But my
suggestion is that we look for ways to make it better—less elitist and less
hierarchical—as well as cheaper.
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INTRODUCTION
Brian Tamanaha’s Failing Law Schools raises several important points
relevant to legal education in the shadow of the great recession. Professor
Tamanaha masterfully covers the exploding cost of law school and
attendant student debt and the potential oversupply of lawyers in relation to
the number of legal jobs available. Particularly compelling is the fact that
law schools produce approximately 45,000 graduates per year, competing
for only 25,000 available legal jobs (as projected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics).1 However, even within these statistics, we know that segments
of the American population continue to be underserved by lawyers and the
legal system.2 In other words, there is still a need for legal services that is
currently unmet by American lawyers. The cost of legal education has
become a key point of reform; if we can reduce the overall cost of legal
education, some of our law graduates might be able to serve these segments
of the American population.
Professor Tamanaha also touches on the fact that the structure of legal
education, strangely tied to a rankings system created by a mostly has-been
news magazine (U.S. News & World Report), has yielded an educational
hierarchy that produces differing amounts of return for a J.D. degree.3 The
higher the school’s rank, the more likely one is to obtain a high-paying job;
graduates of lower-ranked schools will be more challenged in their career
paths.4 As Professor Tamanaha points out, it did not help matters that law
schools obfuscated the employment statistics they publicly presented,
counting any kind of job, legal or non-legal, full-time or part-time, as
employment and hiring their own graduates in order to count those
graduates as employed.5 Amid the massive critical outcry6 (and some class
action lawsuits against law schools) concerning the sketchy data
presentation, law schools are now reforming how they present this data.7
Graduates who come out of lower ranked law schools carry an
immense amount of debt (often well over $100,000) that, when coupled
1.
BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 139 (2012).
2.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 170-171.
3.
Id. at 112.
4.
Id. (explaining that the percentage of law school graduates obtaining jobs at large law firms
decreases as the school’s U.S. News and World Report rank decreases).
5.
Id. at 71-74.
6.
See Lucille A. Jewel, You’re Doing It Wrong: How the Anti-Law School Scam Blogging
Movement Can Shape the Legal Profession, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 239 (2011); Lucille A. Jewel, I
Can Has Lawyer? The Conflict Between the Participatory Culture of the Internet and the Legal
Profession, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 341 (2011) (both arguing that the anti-law school scamblogging movement has had an appreciable impact on the debate concerning legal education reform
issues).
7.
Kyle McEntee, The Problem with Law School, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:09
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kyle-mcentee/law-school-enrollment_b_2250889.html.
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with the stagnant job market, makes it nearly impossible to achieve a
comfortable standard of living.8 There are options for managing these debt
loads, in the form of Income-Based Repayment plans and extended
repayment periods (up to thirty years), but a $100,000 plus price tag for a
legal education is much too high in this economy.
Another problem concerns the fact that law schools often bypass the
students who are most in need of tuition assistance and instead distribute
scholarship funds to those with the best merit indicators (usually the most
socially advantaged students).9 Because U.S. News & World Report
rewards schools for their “selectivity” (measured in terms of GPA and
LSAT score), schools are incentivized to offer scholarships to those
students with the best merit metrics.10 Students who fall on the lower side
of a school’s median merit scores pay full price for their law degree,
effectively subsidizing the education of the higher-performing students.
Because we know, statistically, that students with higher merit indicators
come from higher socioeconomic realms than students with lower scores,
we have a counterintuitive system whereby less wealthy students are
subsidizing the education of the more affluent.11 This is a severe
institutional problem. A shift to a pure need-based system for scholarships
would, of course, remedy this problem.
And finally, Professor Tamanaha reports on the continuing perceived
failure of law schools to adequately prepare lawyers for the practice of law.
For many years, members of the bench and bar have commented negatively
on the overly theoretical focus on legal education, calling for more skills
training and more law teachers who can provide a practical focus on legal
education.
I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Tamanaha that law professors
must take on these crisis points in order to solve the deep structural
problems negatively impacting the legal profession and the legal system as
a whole. If one takes Professor Tamanaha’s book to heart, the takeaway is
that law professors have an ethical and moral obligation to reduce the cost
of legal education. However, I disagree with several of Professor
Tamanaha’s specific ideas for reforming the system.
In this paper, I write from the perspective of a tenured professor
teaching legal skills at a for-profit fourth-tier school12—the type of school
8.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 109-11.
9.
Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 660-661
(2011) (explaining that individuals with lower merit indicators (who are more likely to come from
lower socio-economic backgrounds) receive less tuition assistance than those students with higher
indicators (who are more likely to come from wealthier backgrounds)).
10.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 97-99.
11.
Id. at 96-99.
12.
From 2004 until 2013, I taught legal writing and legal skills courses at Atlanta’s John Marshall
Law School. I was awarded tenure in 2012. In 2013, I accepted a lateral teaching position at the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366511

JEWEL, TALES OF A FOURTH TIER NOTHING (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/11/2013 2:58 PM

Tales of a Fourth Tier Nothing

129

that Professor Tamanaha repeatedly implies is the problem and not the
solution for the legal education crisis.13 Several premises that underlie
Professor Tamanaha’s arguments need to be unpacked. Part One addresses
the idea, which dates back to 1921,14 that students at lower-tier schools
should be able to receive a different education (impliedly lower quality)
than those students matriculating at higher-ranked schools. Part Two
counters Professor Tamanaha’s dichotomous view of legal scholarship and
law teaching, arguing that scholarship and legal theory carry a unique
practical value for students, particularly in the context of a non-elite legal
education. Part Three considers Professor Tamanaha’s puzzling claim that
clinical faculty and legal writing faculty must accept less job security and
unequal pay in order to help save legal education.
Part Four of this paper presents an alternative explanation as to why
students might choose to attend law school, even with the deep economic
hardships involved. In terms of the continuing value of the J.D. degree,
Professor Tamanaha’s narrow economic analysis and the predominant
counterarguments (e.g., you can do anything with a law degree!15) both
miss the point that, for many, a law degree carries a cultural value that
operates apart from (though sometimes in tandem with) economic capital.
The idea that we should impose restraints on the ability of students to
obtain a law degree, if they so choose, is somewhat paternalistic and at
odds with the other free market aspects of his analysis.
I. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST TWO-TIER LEGAL EDUCATION
Professor Tamanaha resurrects the concept of a two-tiered legal
education model with non-elite students, bound for a career representing
ordinary people, attending two-year “Holiday-Inn” law school programs,
and more elite students, bound for a career serving corporate clients,
attending a three-year “Ritz-Carleton [sic]” law school.16 The basic law

University of Tennessee College of Law, which places all law faculty members on a unitary tenure
track, regardless of what subject matter (writing, clinical skills, or doctrine) is taught.
13.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 122. Professor Tamanaha’s contempt for non-elite legal
education is difficult to miss: “A sizable segment of law schools—low-ranked schools with a high
percentage of graduates bearing high debt—produce highly questionable results year in and year out.”
Id.
14.
ALFRED REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 382-385, 418-419
(Carnegie Found. 1921); see also ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 113 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1983); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 110-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1976).
15.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 135-139. On this point, I agree with Paul Campos, who
anecdotally explains that a J.D. might hurt, rather than help, one’s chances of obtaining a non-lawrelated job. See Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177,
198 (2012).
16.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 172-174.
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schools would focus on teaching and practical skills with the more elite
schools retaining a scholarly and theoretical emphasis.17 While Professor
Tamanaha’s hotel metaphor is unique, the idea of a two-tiered model of
legal education is not new. The two-tier idea itself dates back to 1921,
when Alfred Reed recommended two different types of law schools after
studying legal education for the Carnegie Foundation.18 Other
commentators have made the two-tier argument using automobile
metaphors: (Toyota Camry vs. Mercedes)19 and (Volkswagen vs.
Mercedes).20 Apparently, ordinary clients only need the bare minimum in
horsepower, responsiveness, and handling, but wealthier corporate clients
need a luxury lawyer replete with all the bells and whistles that stem from a
“deluxe”21 legal education.
In the 1920s, the American Bar Association and the American
Association of Law Schools rejected Reed’s two-tier idea.22 As Professor
Tamanaha points out, at the time, an ugly cloud of xenophobia, antiSemitism, and racism propelled opposition to cheaper legal education
models, which were perceived as producing too many ethnic and foreignborn lawyers.23 But two wrongs do not make a right. The distasteful
history behind the rejection of the two-tier model for legal education in the
1920s has nothing to do with the merits of an educational system that
would produce a de jure24 hierarchy in the legal profession. As Professor
Susan Carle points out, during this time period, elite lawyers were awash
with anti-egalitarian sentiment, but there was also a genuine concern for the
profession and for the public.25 The unattractive history of American legal
education is there, and it speaks for itself, but we should not discount the
fact that law is a profession designed to serve the American public. And
what is best for the public should be what drives reform, not an implicit

17.
Id. at 174.
18.
REED, supra note 14, at 418-419.
19.
George B. Shepherd, Defending the Aristocracy: ABA Accreditation and the Filtering of
Political Leaders, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 658 (2003).
20.
PAUL CARRINGTON, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAW (Ass’n of Am. Law
Schs. ed., 1971), reprinted in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 152-153, 157 (Herbert L. Packer
& Thomas Ehrlich eds., 1973) [hereinafter THE CARRINGTON REPORT].
21.
Id. at 152-153.
22.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 21-22.
23.
Id.; see also STEVENS, supra note 14, at 92-93; AUERBACH, supra note 14, at 96-100.
Professor Tamanaha argues that “[l]iberal law professors today would doubtless condemn the elitedominated ABA at the turn of the twentieth century for raising the cost of legal education in a way that
restricted access by the poorer classes to the profession.” TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 35.
24.
REED, supra note 14, at 385. Reed’s suggestion was to create a differentiated system of law
practice analogous to the British division between solicitors and barristers. Id.
25.
Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons,
24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1999).
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emotional response generated by revisiting why the two-tier legal education
model failed in the 1920s.
Back in the 1970s, Preble Stoltz expressed the two-tier idea a bit more
crudely. Clients of “Wall Street” firms require lawyers with three years of
education, but clients residing in the “urban ghetto” could do with lawyers
trained for only two years.26 Although the rhetoric has now been cleaned
up, with commentators arguing that a two-year law degree will encourage
more lawyers to pursue public interest work,27 the two-tier model
encapsulates a certain amount of disdain for ordinary, poor, and
disadvantaged clients. That lawyers working for “real people with real
problems”28 can make do with a lesser legal education in comparison to
those lawyers who serve corporate interests does a great disservice to the
individual client. Imagine you have hired a lawyer to defend you on a
misdemeanor charge, and you have the choice of a lawyer. Choice one is
the lawyer who has slept in luxury on 400 thread-count sheets on a
premium mattress and enjoyed every other aspect of the hotel’s legendary
turn down service. Choice two is a lawyer who tossed and turned all night
long, kept awake by a clanking HVAC system and rambunctious hotel
guests who could easily be heard through the room’s razor-thin walls.
Which lawyer would you choose? Only if we can say that two years of
legal education provides a standard of excellence for all clients should we
consider it an option for reform.
Professor Tamanaha’s resurrected two-tier legal education model also
relies on the questionable premise that law graduates from elite schools
enter law practices that require a higher caliber of legal thought than
lawyers (mostly from non-elite schools) who enter a smaller-scale practices
focused on individual clients. The idea is that representing individual
clients is more routine and less complex than working in a large law firm,
which requires higher-level functions. Professor Randolph N. Jonakait
argues that the skills and abilities that lawyers need in order to represent
individual clients are “strikingly different” than those needed by corporate,
large law firm attorneys.29 Jonakait posits:
26.
Preble Stolz, The Two-Year Law School: The Day the Music Died, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 37, 45
(1973).
27.
See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Samuel Estreicher, Make Law Schools Earn a Third Year,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/opinion/practicing-lawshould-not-mean-living-in-bankruptcy.html (“[A] two-year option would allow many newly minted
lawyers to pursue careers in the public interest or to work at smaller firms that serve lower- or averageincome Americans . . . .”).
28.
Lawrence Lessig, A Message to Law Grads: Instead of Corporations, Help Ordinary People,
THE
ATLANTIC
(May
31,
2012,
5:20
PM),
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/05/a-message-to-law-grads-instead-of-corporationshelp-ordinary-people/257945/.
29.
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of Legal Education and the Rise and Fall of
Local Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863, 874 (2007). On this point, Professor Elizabeth
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Small-firm or solo practice calls on few of the legal skills and
knowledge that law schools pride themselves on teaching. The
lawyers in these settings seldom analyze appellate opinions or
parse statutes. Their practices infrequently require memos or
briefs. Legal research hardly ever enters what they do. While the
assumption might be that various written products are usually the
requirement for courtroom work, often that is not the case.30
On the other hand, Jonakait argues, lawyers working for individual clients,
unlike corporate attorneys, “must be able to deal with difficult human
problems and relations.”31 Professor Jonakait relies on Caroll Seron’s
qualitative ethnography of sole practitioners and small firm attorneys in
and around New York City32 to make the distinction between large law
firm and small-scale law practice. While Seron’s well-researched book
supports the contention that some lawyers in the early- to mid- 1990s found
individual client representation to be routine, simple, and form-based,33
personal injury and criminal defense trial lawyers were not part of Seron’s
sample. We know that trial work for individual clients often requires
facility with sophisticated scientific theories (forensic and medical) and the
cognitively challenging mine fields presented by evidentiary and civil
procedure rules. Clearly there are aspects of individual practice that require
facility with complex concepts.
I am also uncertain that attorneys who represent corporate clients do
not also need to embrace the human side of legal problems.34 One of the
things that feeds into an attorney’s practical wisdom is the attorney’s ability
to advise the client on non-legal issues, including ethical and moral issues
that relate to the client’s representation.35 To say that corporate attorneys
must only focus on the legal aspects of the problem and forego all of the

Chambliss has called Jonakait’s conclusions into question. Elizabeth Chambliss, Two Questions For
Law Schools About the Future Boundaries of the Legal Profession, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 329, 338 (2011).
30.
Jonakait, supra note 29, at 887.
31.
Id. at 864; see also Shepherd, supra note 19, at 658 (contrasting attorneys working on
“sophisticated legal matters at elite law firms” with lawyers “working with individuals on simpler
matters”); Daniel J. Morrissey, Saving Legal Education, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 254, 273-275 (2006)
(presenting corporate lawyers and lawyers representing individual clients as dichotomous practices).
32.
Jonakait, supra note 29, at 887 n.108 (citing CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING
LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS 67 (1996)).
33.
See SERON, supra note 32, at 67-68 (describing the tasks of these sample lawyers as “pretty
routine” and not entailing “very much legal research”).
34.
See supra note 33 and surrounding text.
35.
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH
TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 7-9 (Lexis 2d Ed. 2006) (The concept of “[a] collaborative
client counseling model” assumes a relationship in which an attorney and a client consider together the
“effects of their decisions on other people[;]” from their “collaborative deliberation” comes “practical
wisdom,” described as “the ability to make wise judgments.”).
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“human” aspects of an issue limits the attorney’s role, weakens the quality
of the legal services provided, and likely impoverishes legal outcomes.
It is true that the profession is de facto divided and stratified between
lawyers representing wealthy and corporate clients and lawyers
representing ordinary people,36 but I am not certain that the two styles of
practice are markedly different. One might also view large firm work as
encompassing routine and simple tasks, but on a larger scale. Corporate
work often relies heavily on routinized use of forms, and sophisticated
legal research is not often needed, particularly in transactional settings. The
need for differentiated skills training for different styles of practice does
not hold up to rigorous logical scrutiny.
Moreover, elite legal education’s smug conclusion that its law
graduates require a luxury legal education (and all other graduates do not)
conserves status and privilege for those who already reside at the top of
law’s hierarchy.37 In other words, the idea that large law firm practice
necessarily involves more complexity—requiring more years of
education—than a practice representing individual clients qualifies as a
legitimizing myth38 that protects the status of the elite law school (and the
professors who teach within its walls).
It is also unclear, when we think deeply about this, how an elite
educational model built upon abstract theory39 will actually help lawyers
thrive in corporate and big-law positions. Indeed, one of the complaints
about elite law school education is that the elevation of abstract theory over
practice caused law students to gravitate toward the big law firms where
they could receive on-the-job practical training and mentoring.40 Now that

36.
JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 48-51
(2005).
37.
See generally infra note 46.
38.
“Legitimizing myths are values, attitudes, beliefs, causal attributions, and ideologies that
provide moral and intellectual justification for social practices that increase, maintain, or decrease levels
of social inequality among social groups.” Bella L. Galperin et al., Status Differentiation and the
Protean Self: A Social-Cognitive Model of Unethical Behavior in Organizations, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS
407, 415 (2011).
39.
See infra notes 85-87 and surrounding text (explaining that the elite conception of legal
“theory” is abstract and disconnected from practice). Under Professor Tamanaha’s model, elite law
schools retaining a scholarly focus on generating theories “about law” will continue to exist, serving
students who will go into elite (big-law) practice. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 57, 174. Teachers at
practice-oriented schools, in Professor Tamanaha’s view, should not devote much time to theoretical
approaches to the law. See Brian Tamanaha, Why the Interdisciplinary Movement in Legal Academia
Might be a Bad Idea (For Most Law Schools), BALKINIZATION (January 16, 2008, 9:44 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/01/why-interdisciplinary-movement-in-legal.html
(arguing
that
interdisciplinary approaches to law have little value in a non-elite school where the primary focus
should be practice).
40.
Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense
Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 732 (1996) (citing Karl E.
Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What’s Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 336 (1982)).
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the large law firms have shelved on-the-job training for junior associates,41
it remains uncertain how the elite law school’s intellectual identity
(emphasizing abstract theory) will match up with its traditional role as a
feeder school for big-law practice.
The two-tier model might also be understood as a response to the
reality that the legal profession is made up of two hemispheres: one group
of lawyers serving corporate clients and another group serving mostly
individual clients.42 In terms of legal education, graduates of the highest
ranked law schools end up in high-paying positions representing large
organizations, with graduates from the non-elite schools representing
individual clients.43
Hierarchy in the legal profession, in existence at the time of the Reed
report in 1921,44 prompted some to argue that legal education should split
into two tiers that would simply mirror the pre-existing structure of the
legal profession.45 However, a de jure two-track system would further
entrench social and economic divides within the legal profession,46 divides
that we should be working to ameliorate, not exacerbate. The class and
status distinctions that would be codified by a de jure two-track system are
visible in Alfred Reed’s 1921 prediction of what would happen if
America’s de facto two-track system became de jure. In 1921, American
law schools were divided into two different types: the elite schools
employed Langdell’s new case-method and the non-elite schools (many
serving working class and immigrant students) used the older textbook
teaching method.47 In his report, Reed explained that graduates from the
top-tier case-method schools are “the leaven, but they can never be the
lump, in our slowly rising American democracy.”48 Reed described the
lower-tier graduate as “well informed and expert, but not necessarily
profound,” 49 lawyers who will “constitute in a sense. . . an inferior grade,

41.
See Nancy B. Rapoport, Changing the Modal Law School: Rethinking U.S. Legal Education in
(Most) Schools, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1119, 1130 (2012) (explaining the inability of law firms to
continue to train novice lawyers).
42.
Chambliss, supra note 29, at 335-36 (citing JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN,
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319 (1982)); see also JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL.,
URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 7 (2005).
43.
Chambliss, supra note 29, at 336.
44.
REED, supra note 14, at 418-19 (noting that Reed saw the division as being between Lincoln
style lawyers and those lawyers bound for the Judiciary).
45.
Chambliss, supra note 29, at 336.
46.
See generally Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155 (2008).
47.
REED, supra note 14, at 381-85. This was before American legal education came to be more or
less uniform, which occurred when states adopted consistent legal education accreditation standards.
48.
Id. at 384.
49.
Id.
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to whom the highest professional honors will not be paid.”50 Eventually,
Reed predicted that bar admission rules would evolve into de jure
distinctions between these groups, with “each group being given special
privileges that the other may not invade.”51 But these distinctions would be
undeniably hierarchical. If lower-tier graduates came to resent their
“subordinate position . . . in the private practice of the law,” the wellintentioned Reed suggested that these graduates might enter politics and
campaign to become legislators.52
That de facto hierarchy exists does not justify further segmentation in
the profession. The democratic ideals that underlie our profession demand
a unitary profession that adheres to a collective standard of excellence in
representing all clients, regardless of their position in society. At this point
in time, we should seize existing opportunities to reform the structure of
legal education, making it more inclusive and removing the extreme social
distance53 existing at its highest levels.
The possibility of making the J.D. a two-year graduate degree instead
of requiring a three-year course of study would certainly do much to reduce
the cost of legal education. Indeed, it might be possible to produce highquality lawyers in two years.54 The Carrington Report’s 1971
recommendation to “achieve economies by abandoning the doctrinal
organization” of the law school curriculum55 was a prescient one, mirroring
the Carnegie Report’s suggestion that law schools integrate the curriculum
so that each course touches upon substantive legal knowledge, professional
lawyer identity, and practice skills.56 The Carrington Report’s concept of
bringing “the hidden curriculum” to the forefront and using substantive law
as the context for lessons on legal process, advocacy, and critical
approaches to the law could result in a significantly more efficient and less
costly legal education.57 Such a drastic re-ordering of the traditional law
school curriculum also contains opportunities for law schools to draw upon
the expertise of non-casebook faculty, particularly those professors who

50.
Id. at 385.
51.
Id.
52.
REED, supra note 14, at 385.
53.
“The vast majority of American law students come from relatively elite backgrounds; this is
especially true at the most prestigious law schools, where only five percent of all students come from
families whose SES is in the bottom half of the national distribution.”
Sander, supra note 9, at 632.
54.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 20-21 (citing THE CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 20, at 97162, 139).
55.
THE CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 20, at 98.
56.
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 186, 194-200 (2009) [hereinafter THE CARNEGIE REPORT].
57.
THE CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 20, at 129.
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specialize in teaching legal skills and legal writing.58 Legal educators
should pursue this kind of collaboration, putting aside competing
professional identities and hierarchical turf wars, with twin goals in mind—
improving the quality and reducing the cost of law school.
If the two-year J.D. becomes the model for the legal profession in
America, it might very well be that elite employers will require more than
the two-year J.D. Recently, the two track educational model resurfaced in
the discussion of reducing the number of legal education years required to
practice law. NYU’s Professor Estreicher brought the idea to the table with
the New York State Bar administrators as a way to reduce the cost of legal
education.59 In response, Northwestern Law School Dean Daniel Rodriquez
stated that two years might be acceptable for those going into “nonlaw firm
jobs,”60 but NYU Law Dean Richard Revesz argued that “law firms, judges
and federal agencies” may not be willing to hire individuals with only two
years of education.61 That corporate law firms will refuse to hire graduates
with only two years of law school is undercut by the large corporate
partnerships in England, which do fine with solicitors with six total years of
legal education.62 If we decide that two years is sufficient for entry into the
profession (and it very well may be), then two years should be sufficient
for all styles of law practice. We might see, however, different law schools
maintaining different focuses within their two-year programs.
Nonetheless, if elite legal employers do decide that a more expensive
education is necessary for their hiring needs, the way to think about this
decision is not an ineluctable splitting of American legal education into a
two-tier model that mirrors its pre-existing social structure. Rather, we
might view this trend as the “skyboxification” of legal education.63

58.
For instance, the integration of writing skills within the first-year doctrinal classes would be
one possibility to achieve a more efficient first year legal education. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, LRW
Program Design: A Manifesto for the Future, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 591, 598 (2010) (explaining
that the University of Baltimore Law School integrates writing into its first year doctrinal courses).
59.
Karen Sloan, FDR Did Fine Without a 3L Year, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (January 14,
2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202584156317&FDR_did_fine_without_a_3L_yea
r_&slreturn=20130121165754; Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar
Eligibility after Two Years of Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2012) (noting that
NYU’s Professor Estreicher has brought the idea to the table with New York State bar administrators,
arguing that it will make legal education less expensive).
60.
Sloan, supra note 59 (describing a comment from Northwestern Law School Dean Daniel
Rodriquez).
61.
Id. (explaining a comment from NYU Law School Dean Richard Revesz).
62.
Nigel Duncan, Gatekeepers Training Hurdlers: The Training and Accreditation of Lawyers in
England and Wales, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 911, 913 (2004).
63.
“At a time of rising inequality, the marketization of everything means that people of affluence
and people of modest means lead increasingly separate lives. We live and work and shop and play in
different places. Our children go to different schools. You might call it the skyboxification of
American life. It’s not good for democracy, nor is it a satisfying way to live.” Michael Sandel, What
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Skyboxification refers to the phenomenon of Americans using their market
power to buy position and status, setting themselves apart from the rest of
society. By thinking of extra “deluxe” legal education as analogous to
paying for a skybox seat, the rhetoric becomes not one where representing
individuals requires lesser training, but one where elite status in the law
profession requires an additional, and arguably unnecessary, expenditure of
funds. That elite status will come most easily to those with pre-existing
wealth may not change, but we can control the rhetoric and call a spade a
spade.
As a potential remedy for the high cost of legal education, the two-year
idea should be pursued. But there is no justification for the idea that the
two-year degree would be good for some students and some clients, but not
others. If we are going to move to a two-year degree, then the move should
only be done if the two-year degree is sufficient to educate all lawyers, not
just the ones slated for the middle and lower tiers of the profession.
II. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP
Professor Tamanaha argues that professors who engage in scholarship,
particularly at non-elite schools, are unnecessarily raising the cost of legal
education for students.64 For Professor Tamanaha, scholarship is a luxury
that non-elite schools (which must focus on teaching practical skills)
cannot afford.65 Professor Tamanaha’s argument leans on the premise that
legal scholarship has little to do with the practice of law. Referencing wellknown critiques presenting legal scholarship as disconnected to the law as
it is experienced by lawyers and judges,66 Tamahaha questions the
continuing value of scholarship by law professors, especially law
professors at non-elite schools, where “students should not be made to bear
a costly burden for faculty research.”67 I would like to raise several points
here in response to the suggestion that non-elite schools give up on faculty
scholarship.
Citing a 1968 law review article by Thomas Bergin, Professor
Tamanaha accepts the premise that a law teacher can be either a practiceoriented teacher (the pure-Hessian trainer who prepares lawyers to function

Money Can’t Buy, The Skyboxification of American Life, THE HUFFINGTON POST (April 20, 2012, 8:20
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-sandel/what-money-cant-buy_b_1442128.html.
64.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 61.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 55-56 (citing Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges are Finding Law Reviews
Irrelevant,
N.Y.
TIMES,
March
19,
2007,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html?_r=0; Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992)).
67.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 61.
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as hired guns) or an academic scholar, but cannot be both.68 Like bellbottoms and macramé wall hangings, this dichotomy between the law
teacher and the law scholar is a bit outdated, reflective of a pre-Watergate,
Paper Chase69 era where law teaching could only be visualized as training
ruthless mercenaries, an antimony hopelessly opposed to scholarly pursuits
of the mind.70
Bergin’s pure-Hessian trainer vs. teacher schizophrenia metaphor no
longer makes sense in light of the fact that both law teaching and law
scholarship have evolved since 1968. It is no longer acceptable to describe
law teaching as training mercenary hired guns. After the Watergate
scandal,71 we began to teach students how to use their knowledge of the
law to manipulate legal processes in an ethical and professional manner.72
This more holistic approach to law teaching requires engagement with legal
texts as well as interdisciplinary and non-legal approaches to legal
problem-solving.73 Most would agree that the best practices for law
teaching should supplement the classic case method pedagogy and
incorporate contextual approaches to learning the law.74 Contextual
approaches to legal problems often generate well-suited topics for critical
legal scholarship.75 In this way, law teaching and law scholarship are
mutually beneficial.
It is also not necessarily the case that theoretical scholarship lacks
practical value. Professor Tamanaha argues that “[theoretical scholarship]
is not immediately relevant to the daily tasks of judges and lawyers,
although it may have direct and indirect benefits for the legal system more

68.
Id. at 55 (citing Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA.
L. REV. 637 (1968)).
69.
THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).
70.
Bergin, supra note 68, at 638.
71.
With the Watergate scandal and the resultant public disgust for the lawyers involved in it, there
was a push for more ethics training in law schools; the result was that most schools made legal ethics a
required part of the curriculum. See AUERBACH, supra note 14, at 41; STEVENS, supra note 14, at 237.
72.
THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 56, at 57-58.
73.
Rapoport, supra note 41, at 1145 (“Good lawyers use an understanding of psychology,
sociology, economics, history, and business in their work . . . .”); Kim Diana Connolly, Elucidating the
Elephant: Interdisciplinary Law School Classes, 11 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 13-14 (“[S]uccessful
legal problem-solving sometimes means that lawyers need to be able to collaborate with other
professionals in order to address a client’s problems” and “most of today’s lawyers live in a more
complex world that would benefit from interdisciplinary training.”).
74.
THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 56, at 57-58; Gerald P. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers
To Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L.
REV. 305, 307 (1989).
75.
See Bryan L. Adamson et al., The Status of Clinical Faculty in the Legal Academy: Report of
the Task Force on the Status of Clinicians and the Legal Academy, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 353, 370 (2012)
(explaining that clinical faculty, because of their experience representing disenfranchised individuals,
are particularly suited to produce critical scholarship that investigates “legal processes below the radar
of appellate case study [the traditional province of doctrinal scholarship]”).
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generally.”76 Although law review articles that speak to “the influence of
Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria”77
present easy targets in the ongoing critique of legal education, effective
scholarly writing does not have to be disconnected from the practice of law
at the ground level. 78 Professor John Henry Schlegel, in grappling with the
value of theoretical scholarship to students, believes that the theory works
in a small-sense when it helps students understand the inner workings of
the law from a bureaucratic and institutional perspective.79 In speaking
about the value of theoretical scholarship in Failing Law Schools, Professor
Tamanaha seems to rely on a fairly abstract80 definition of legal theory.
Although an abstract notion of legal theory is favored in elite legal
education settings,81 there is a broader definition of legal theory that
embraces a deeper connection to praxis.82 Given our mission to produce
practice-ready lawyers, scholars teaching at lower-tier schools are not as
beholden to the elite notion of “theory” in the abstract. Thus, our
institutional culture often encourages the production of theoretical
scholarship that connects to the practice of law at the ground level.
Rather than a disconnect between scholarship and law practice and
scholarship and teaching, we often see a tripartite symbiotic relationship
develop between scholarship, teaching, and law practice. For instance,
Professor Jonathan Rapping, a colleague of mine, studies the criminal
justice system, uncovering the institutional and cultural forces that can
obstruct justice.83 He tries to identify ways to fix a broken culture that has
both criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors shuffling clients through
the system with little regard for the principle of zealous advocacy.84
76.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 57.
77.
Law Prof Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Description of Legal Scholarship, ACS BLOG
(July
5,
2011),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justiceroberts%E2%80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship (explaining Chief Justice Roberts’s description of
the type of topic one is likely to see in a standard law journal).
78.
See Sternlight, supra note 40 (explaining how legal theory, even seemingly abstract legal
theory such as critical legal studies and feminist legal theory, can be connected to the practice of law);
see also LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL THEORY IN READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 181-202 (2012) (explaining how various strands of legal theory can practically be used to
support written legal arguments).
79.
John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can’t Think Normatively, What Are We To Do?, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 955, 964-65 (2003).
80.
See Sternlight, supra note 40, at 715 (explaining that the elite conception of legal theory has it
disconnected from law practice).
81.
See id.
82.
See id. at 713 (explaining a common sense jurisprudence that seeks to connect critical legal
theory to practice).
83.
Jonathan Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent
Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POLICY
REV. 161, 162-63 (2009); Jonathan Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American
Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513, 555-68 (2012).
84.
See Rapping, supra note 83.
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Professor Rapping then brings his critical perspective into his criminal law
and criminal procedure classes. Recently, Professor Rapping circulated an
email from a recent graduate who thanked him for his classroom teaching:
I don’t know if you remember me. But I took Criminal Procedure
with you in 2009. I graduated 2010. . . . I am contacting you today
because I had a horrible day in court today. I’m attempting to
suppress custodial statements obtained in violation of Miranda. The
judge is hearing the motion during the bench trial. It’s a felony
burglary charge, but still in juvenile court. I’m feeling discouraged
because everyone is acting like I’m wasting their time and it is
possible that the State could make the case absent the confession.
But I feel like it’s my duty to hold the state to the fire. I’ve gotta
[sic] stand up for this juvenile and the Constitution. I now ask for
help in making me feel good about fighting a fight I know that
oftentimes I will lose and be treated like a jerk for fighting.
And then, later on in the day, Professor Rapping received this update:
I won the motion and trial!!!! My client went home to his parents
today!
The above exchange exemplifies the symmetry between scholarship,
teaching, and ground-level law practice; further, it explains the enduring
value of legal scholarship in non-elite schools where the core mission is to
prepare lawyers to represent individuals in an imperfect legal system.
Professor Rapping brought his research on the harmful ecologies in our
criminal justice system into the classroom and attempted to provide his
students with a kind of professional armor, something that would allow
them to resist the deep-seated cultural and institutional influences that
impede zealous advocacy. Professor Rapping’s work on the troubled
culture of the criminal justice system informed his teaching, which in turn
factored into this alumnus’s decision to “hold the state to the fire.” In this
way, the fourth-tier scholar is the best kind of academic. The teachers,
scholars, and practitioners at my institution produce lawyers who can
challenge the system on the ground level rather than cookie-cutter attorneys
content to exist in a culture of mediocrity.
Also puzzling is Professor Tamanaha’s apparent surprise that, at some
schools, clinicians and legal writing teachers are engaging in scholarship.
Professor Tamanaha writes, with somewhat of an indignant tone, that “the
designated and avowed Hessian trainers on law faculties are themselves
morphing into scholars.”85 Professor Tamanaha’s own professional
85.

TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 60.
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identity86 seems to be founded on the practical teacher/scholar dichotomy.
While the idea that a clinician or legal writing faculty member could—and
would—engage in scholarship presents a challenge to the traditional law
teacher’s professional identity, in our current legal education crisis, those
faculty members who can both effectively teach practical skills and engage
in useful scholarship might very well be the future of the legal academy.87
Finally, I must respond to Professor Tamanaha’s point that scholarship
is just too costly for non-elite schools to engage in. Here, it is worth
mentioning that some schools (such as Atlanta’s John Marshall Law
School) require their faculty to engage in scholarship as part of the job
description but do not adopt the incentive structures used at elite schools.
At this institution, all full-time faculty are expected to write scholarship as
well as teach six credits a semester. 88 Professors do not receive summer
research stipends, sabbaticals, or lightened course loads in order to do so.
It bears mentioning here that Professor Tamanaha’s description of the
typical law professor’s easy and comfortable work-life89 does not
accurately describe the experience of all professors.90 Given the portrait of
the lazy law professor91 that has dominated the literature on legal education
reform, perhaps a lesson on how the other half lives92 is in order. For each

86.
See John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists:
The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 321-22 (1985)
(explaining how the acolytes of Langdell cooperated to produce accreditation standards that enshrined
the case method professor as the dominant model of law professor).
87.
See generally Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Sea Change: The Seismic Shift in the Legal Profession
and How Legal Writing Professors Will Keep Legal Education Afloat in its Wake, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 49 (2011).
88.
The median salary at Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School is approximately one-third less than
the $147,000 average median law professor salary Professor Tamanaha estimates in his book.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 49.
89.
Id. at 4.
90.
The common perception that law professors are “lazy” has recently been challenged by
concrete descriptions of the “vigorous work ethic” of the best law teachers in the United States. See
Colleen Flaherty, What The Best Law Teachers Do, INSIDE HIGHER ED (August 7, 2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/07/new-book-emphasizes-role-pedagogy-law-schools
(reporting on MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ ET AL., WHAT THE BEST LAW TEACHERS DO (Harvard
Univ. Press 2013)).
91.
Ethan Bronner, A Call for Drastic Changes in Educating New Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, February
10, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/lawyers-call-for-drastic-change-ineducating-new-lawyers.html (“One group that came under frequent attack at the meeting here [The
ABA Task Force on Legal Education] was tenured law school professors, who were criticized as having
high pay, low productivity and a remote relationship with the practice of law.”); Arthur D. Austin, The
Wasteland of Law School Fiction, 1989 DUKE L.J. 495, 503 (“[Law faculty s]hirkers exploit the
casebook and instruction manual to minimize class preparation and reserve time to read the Village
Voice or play squash.”).
92.
JACOB A. RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES (2010) (presenting a photo-documentary of
individuals living in the New York City tenements in the Nineteenth Century).
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of the six hours of class that I teach93 in a given week, I also spend at least
twelve hours on class preparation, carefully constructing practice exercises
and contextualized lessons for my students. Because I am a legal writing
teacher, I routinely devote twenty to thirty hours a week commenting on
and assessing my students’ written work.94 Any given week also has me
spending several hours working with students in a service capacity,
coaching both moot court and mock trial teams. And then there are a few
hours of writing reports for the committees that I serve on. I routinely
work fifty- and sixty-hour weeks. And when the weekend comes, I respond
to emails and texts from my students seeking guidance on their
assignments. I rarely have time to research and write scholarship during
the semester when I am teaching; I work on my writing during the summer
and winter breaks. But I would not want to give up my scholarly agenda,
because, as explicated above, my research makes me a much more effective
teacher. My teaching job is not exactly “The Big Rock Candy Mountain,”95
but it is nonetheless extremely rewarding.
This section has sought to show that (1) research at non-elite
institutions has deep value and (2) legal skills professors who engage in
scholarship are not some unnatural combination of yin and yang, but rather
capitalize on unique synergies integral to the production of well-rounded,
practice-oriented, and professionally-minded attorneys. These points bleed
into my next section, which addresses Professor Tamanaha’s puzzling
exhortation that clinicians and legal writing teachers—the law teachers
most responsible for teaching law students practical skills—take one for the
team and halt our campaign for the same level of job security, faculty
governance rights, and pay scales that our casebook colleagues have
enjoyed for years. At this point in the history of legal education, we are at
a juncture where we can seriously consider fixing structural issues such as
the exorbitant cost of legal education and the longstanding disparities
between practical skills teachers and casebook law faculty. There is no
reason we cannot tackle both of these issues in an effort to reform the entire
system, not just a piece of it.

93.
Although I write in the present tense, this description is based on my experience at Atlanta’s
John Marshall Law School. Given the intensive nature of what I teach (legal writing), the temporal
aspects of my job have not changed upon my move to a different institution.
94.
My casebook colleagues work just as hard as I do. Where my workload tilts heavily on the
assessment side, our culture of teaching excellence requires our casebook faculty to devote most of their
time to class preparation.
95.
Brad Wendel, The Big Rock Candy Mountain: How to Get a Job in Law Teaching, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY, http://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty-pages/wendel/teaching.htm (last visited
February 21, 2013).
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III. EQUITY FOR SKILLS FACULTY
In Chapter Three of his book, Professor Tamanaha documents the
opposition to proposed ABA Accreditation standards “that would end the
legal academy’s commitment to the system of tenure and security of
position for law school deans, traditional faculty, clinical faculty, legal
writing faculty, and librarians.”96 In Professor Tamanaha’s view, the
opposition to this proposal is motivated purely by law professor selfinterest; the argument that there is a connection between tenure and better
educational outcomes is purely pretextual.97 Professor Tamanaha then
singles out clinical law faculty for arguing against removal of an
accreditation standard that guaranteed a minimum of job security (“at least
a five year contract that is presumptively renewable”).98 Professor
Tamanaha writes that “clinicians, along with everyone else in law schools,
must consider the economic implications of clinical programs and separate
more sharply those work conditions they would like for themselves from
what is necessary to best educate law students at an affordable cost.”99
While the proposed standards that Professor Tamanaha discusses will
not abolish tenure but will allow law schools to choose whether or not to
create tenure stream faculty positions,100 the proposal would have enabled
law schools to more easily place its non-casebook faculty—clinicians, legal
writing teachers, and adjuncts—in at-will and contingent employment
situations, while retaining tenure status for the casebook research
professors already at the top of the hierarchy.101 When we look more
closely at the potential costs and benefits of eradicating these security of
position standards, Professor Tamanaha’s arguments become tenuous.
First, Professor Tamanaha’s functionalist response to the caste-system
among law professors is to shrug it off as a product of “[t]he market for law
professors and governance within law schools.”102 Let’s be clear here, the
current hierarchy among law professors is not the product of a pure free
96.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 28.
97.
Id. at 29-30 (“AALS president Michael Olivas would have none of it.”).
98.
Id. at 32. Rather than engage with the argument that job security for clinicians produces the
pedagogical benefit of having a clinical faculty fully engaged with and committed to the law school as
an institution, Professor Tamanaha frames the arguments as self-interested attempts to use accreditation
standards “for the benefit of its own interest group.” Id. (applying in the context of the Justice
Department/ABA anti-trust consent decree, which clinical professors criticized as not going far enough
to provide job security and status equality).
99.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 34-35.
100.
Id. at 29.
101.
See id. at 31. Professor Tamanaha implicitly concedes as much when he argues that leaner
accreditation standards would allow research institutions to continue to commit to “research faculty”
and allow other schools to rely more heavily on “adjuncts and . . . full-time professors with practice
experience.” Id.
102.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 33.
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market. The same set of elites who rejected the two-tier legal education
system in the 1920s also used the burgeoning accreditation regulations to
enshrine their notion of the professional law teacher.103 This new
professional identity (which came with tenure protections) encompassed
the elite Langdellian podium professor and excluded all other models,
including adjuncts and other professors who used the intellectually
substandard lecture method.104
Moreover, even if we could explain the inequitable hierarchy among
law professors as a natural product of “the market,” legal education is
currently engaged with a severe market failure.105 Specifically, we are
trying to figure out ways to bring down the cost of legal education, which
has spiraled out of control, fueled by free access to federal loan funds. If
we are engaging with a market failure here, then why not fix all that ails
legal education, rather than just tackling one aspect of it?
Professor Tamanaha is not alone in singling out skills faculty106 as
being partially responsible for driving up the cost of legal education. Paul
Campos, legal education’s other high profile prophet, points to clinical
legal education as the problem rather than the solution.107 The scapegoating
of skills professors reflects a longstanding hostility between traditional law
professors and professors who assume more of a practice-oriented
professional identity.108 Some commentators have argued that traditional
(research-oriented) law professors exhibit hostility toward legal skills
professors because legal skills professors pose a serious challenge to the
professor’s self-esteem and professional identity.109

103.
Schlegel, supra note 86, at 321-22.
104.
See id.
105.
HOWARD J. SHERMAN ET AL., ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADITIONAL AND
PROGRESSIVE VIEWS 428 (2008) (describing a market failure as “a situation in which market outcomes
are not socially optimal or desirable”).
106.
See, e.g., Campos, supra note 15, at 191, 195. At this point, I am using “skills faculty” to
designate clinical faculty, as well as faculty who primarily teach legal writing. Professor Tamanaha
singles out the clinicians for standing in the way of lowering the cost of legal education. Professor
Campos has aimed the cost argument more broadly, at both clinical programs and legal writing
programs. Id.
107.
See id.
108.
See generally Douglas D. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism in
Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 242 (1985) (describing the practice-oriented teacher as being
“engaged in a hard-fought, continuing, bitter struggle with the traditionl [sic] legal scholar”); Norman
Redlich, Clinical Education: Stranger in an Elitist Club, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201, 207 (1981-1982)
(noting that traditional law faculty insist that practice oriented skills are not important); Robert E.
Oliphant, When Will Clinicians Be Allowed to Join the Club, 3 LEARNING & LAW 35, 36 (1976) (stating
that traditional law faculty view clinical teaching as falling outside the core mission of legal education,
which is to graduate persons “learned in the law”).
109.
Redlich, supra note 108, at 207 (“Viewed in this context, clinical teachers strike a very
sensitive nerve because they emphasize the very things that traditional teachers have downgraded in the
course of developing their own self-esteem.”). For a discussion of how the traditional law professor’s
professional identity was formed in opposition to the lecturer/teacher common in many law schools
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Today’s legal reform ideas are likely influenced, at least implicitly, by
the bald-faced elitism appearing in the law reform literature in the 1970s,
when clinical and skills-based education first gained a “toehold”110 in legal
education. Within this literature, there is a heavy disdain for anything
involving the representation of ordinary, individual clients. For instance, in
a 1971 report funded by the Ford Foundation, Paul Carrington viewed
clinical education as a threat to a rigorous legal education because students
might use an experience in a clinic “as an escape from the intellectual
rigors of sound professional training.”111 The 1972 report written by
Professors Parker and Ehrlich, funded by the Carnegie Foundation,
similarly states a concern that students and teachers might use legal clinics
to bypass the entrenched merit structure to obtain status in an arguably
illicit way.112 “We are . . . concerned that an anti-intellectual tendency of
clinical education will offer an allure to students and to some faculty
members who seek ‘relevance’ at any price.”113
For Professor Carrington, law clinics also represented a suspect
instructional model because they necessarily involved the distraction of
individual clients:
Liberated from the needs of clients, simulated clinical experiences
can more easily fit academic schedules and calendars. A clinical
method which introduces real clients into the teaching activity
distracts both teacher and student from one another and from the
learning process to the pressing needs of clients.114
Carrington further opined that simulations would solve another problem
with experiential learning—interactions with live legal clients are boring
and unintellectual.
Instead of engaging with live clients, which
“necessarily feature[s] much legal mechanics,” simulation offered a better
model for law learning because it “avoids the deadening routine of the
standardized task.”115 The 1972 Packer and Ehrlich Report similarly argued
that representation of “poverty-stricken clients . . . involve[s] much
repetitious, intellectually low-level work and . . . few law students gain
before Landgell’s revolution, see Schlegel, supra note 86. Schlegel argues that the new Langellian
casebook professor disparaged the older style of professor as lacking in intellectual ability as a way of
cementing their own elevated status in a new profession, the professional law teacher. See id. at 32021.
110.
Oliphant, supra note 108, at 36.
111.
THE CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 20, at 134.
112.
HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 46
(Report Prepared by the Carnegie Foundation) (McGraw Hill 1972) [hereinafter THE PACKER &
EHRLICH REPORT].
113.
Id.
114.
THE CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 20, at 134.
115.
Id. at 134.
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from it a commitment to professional responsibility.”116 The thinking at the
time was that real client needs are just too inconvenient and uninteresting
to place at the forefront of legal education.
This is a rehash of the view documented above that the work of
individual client representation is more routine and less complex than more
“intellectual” and “interesting” legal problems presumably involving
corporate issues. Yes, representing individual clients necessarily involves
some low-level legwork (as does representing high status clients), and
sometimes the work is not interesting. The critique of clinical education as
not being intellectual enough completely misses the point as to what law
practice should be about. The profession of law does not exist to entertain
lawyers with complex brainteasers that only engage a person’s higher-level
cognitive functions. Rather, the profession exists to serve clients; we
cannot expect the work to always be fun and interesting.
Clinical education critics also argue that clinics fail to offer enough
critique, neglecting the “intellectually interesting means/ends problems of
changing the structural characteristics of society.”117 In a 1986 article
entitled “Tastes Great, Less Filling”: The Law School Clinic and Political
Critique, Robert J. Condlin suggests a rather cumbersome model for
clinical education that would involve both a clinical professor and a lawyer
supervising the law student in an externship setting.118 The lawyer would
supervise and guide the student in the performance of the legal tasks and
the clinical professor would meet with the student to “discuss the policy
questions implicit in the student’s practice.”119 Such a cumbersome
approach is necessary, according to Professor Condlin, because “critique
should be given priority over skills training.”120
Faulting clinical education because it does not critique reflects what
Gerald Lopez has identified as “legal education’s romance with formal law
and with the technocratic role of lawyers.”121 For some time, elite legal
educators have held fast to the belief that legal education is meant to
prepare lawyers to function as powerful top-down policymakers. In their
seminal article, Professors Lasswell and McDougal posited that law school
116.
THE PACKER & EHRLICH REPORT, supra note 112 at 45.
117.
Id. at 43.
118.
Robert J. Condlin, “Tastes Great, Less Filling”: The Law School Clinic and Political Critique,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 63 (1986). Despite his apparent predilection for proletariat beer and radical
critical theory, Condlin does not hide his offensive elitism when he asserts, without any kind of support,
that clinical professors are not the best persons to teach legal skills because “as a group clinical teachers
(1) were not the best performers in law school, (2) are young and inexperienced in comparison with the
bar as a whole, (3) do not work in elite law firms or with anything approximating such firms’ facilities
and resources, and (4) because they work with novices on relatively simple cases (usually by
pedagogical choice) are not likely to be on the frontiers of new skill developments.” Id. at 60-61 n.45.
119.
Id. at 63.
120.
Id. at 74.
121.
Lopez, supra note 74, at 323.
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should “contribute to the training of policy-makers for the ever more
complete achievement of the democratic values that constitute the
professed ends of American polity.”122 Others have criticized this model of
legal education and lawyering, arguing that it is too grandiose and
authoritarian.123
Besides the fact that an emphasis on top-down policy-making might
push attorneys towards authoritarian modes of practice, the reality is that
very few individuals actually make their way into high-level policy-making
positions in this day and age. This is particularly true when we know that
only 55%124 of all law graduates are getting a job, any job, much less a job
in the “power elite.”125 The lawyer as a grand policy-maker model may
have worked during the progressive era, but now, there is a deep distrust
for broad collective governmental solutions to social problems.
Moreover, we also might say that our general culture is moving away
from a top-down approach at all levels and is instead embracing more
emergent, fluid, and even small-scale solutions.126 And, if we want to use
the law as a means for creating more egalitarian outcomes, top-down
approaches are not the only means available. As Michel Foucault has
written, power is not necessarily enacted in top-down fashion, but is often
produced at the micro level through a “myriad of micro rules,
regimentations, and time tables imposed on our everyday life, ensuring the
retention of social order and the status quo.”127 Instead of a single sovereign
controlling power and meting out punishment, in modern Western society,

122.
Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943).
123.
Roger C. Cramton, The Trouble With Lawyers (and Law Schools), 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 369
(1985). “A lawyer who knows best what is in the client’s and the public’s interest, who is empirically
oriented, and who uses social data to formulate broad solutions for social problems. This is an image of
the lawyer not as serving, but as dominating, clients.” Id. This article was a response to a critique of
the legal system offered by Harvard Law School Dean Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice
and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570 (1983).
124.
Campos, supra note 15, at 199.
125.
See generally C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 4 (Oxford 2000) (defining members of the
power elite as individuals in positions “to make decisions having major consequences”).
126.
See generally Gillian Hadfield, Law for a Flat World: Legal Infrastructure and the New
Economy, 8 I/S: J.L & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 8 (2011) (arguing that a craftsman and firm-based
approach to legal services is “outdated and ill-suited” to today’s “[f]ast-paced, global, niche-driven, and
increasingly network- rather than firm-based” economy). For a view on how micro and communitydriven approaches to law will become the norm in a future where oil is no longer as plentiful, see
Richardson R. Lynn, It’s Not the End of the World, But You Can See It From There: Legal Education in
“The Long Emergency,” 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 377, 380 (2009). If we accept James Howard Kunstler’s
predictions of what our society will look like as the world’s oil reserves become depleted (economies
will move from the global and national to the local), large law firms will disappear and communitybased law firms and sole practitioners will become the main form of law practice.
127.
Jewel, supra note 6, at 374 n.173 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 205,
216, 220 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977))).
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power is created within a bureaucratic system, “an infinitesimal distribution
of the power relations.”128
If one is interested in pursuing actions that change the balance of
power, this can be done in everyday settings in minor and subtle ways.129
In the context of critique, clinical experiences provide students with an
understanding of how the micro processes of law work and offer them a
chance to manipulate these processes to produce more just outcomes.
Unlike Professor Condlin’s view of clinical education, clinical experiences
do not exist in opposition to structural critique. There is ample room for
both action on behalf of the powerless and inquiry into the best practices
for lawyers “to operate in order that fair and just states of affairs be
produced.”130
Privileging thought exercises that lend themselves to policy-making
and structural critique (because they are interesting and important) and
denigrating those skills necessary for individual client representation
(because they are routine and unimportant) might actually limit the amount
of good that lawyers can do in society. We are beyond the 1970s now, and
it is somewhat unfair to ascribe these views to current participants in the
law school reform debate (such as Professor Tamanaha) when their views
may have evolved since then. But one must wonder, in evaluating the
value of clinical and skills education, whether the elitist tail is wagging the
fiscal dog.
Professor Tamanaha’s position is that clinical education131 and parity
for clinical professors is too costly. The low student/teacher ratio in
clinical settings is heralded as the reason that skills faculty cannot be
afforded equal status to their traditional law professor colleagues.
However, as others have argued,
These arguments are usually mounted on the assumptions that
traditional tenure-track professors exclusively teach large128.
FOUCAULT, supra note 127, at 216.
129.
See generally William L.F. Felstiner and Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating
Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Relations, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449 (1992).
130.
Condlin, supra note 118, at 49.
131.
This is a particularly “sticky” argument when it comes to equity for skills teachers; it has been
around a long time. THE PACKER & EHRLICH REPORT, supra note 112, at 45-46 (arguing that the cost
of clinical education is too great to justify it); THE CARRINGTON REPORT, supra note 20, at 134
(explaining that clinical education was not included in the suggested curricular reform for legal
education because “it cannot withstand a cost-benefit analysis as a dominant method of instruction”);
Bayless Manning, Law Schools and Lawyer Schools – Two Tier Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC.
379, 384 (1973-1974) (arguing that state bar “lawyer schools” should take on the cost of teaching legal
skills because it would cost too much for traditional law schools to take on the task); Oliphant, supra
note 108, at 37 (“Law schools which have traditionally ‘made money’ will be extremely reluctant to
adopt a teaching model requiring the addition of expensive experienced faculty and an enormous
reduction in the student/teacher ratio.”); Campos, supra note 15, at 191 (noting that because of its low
student/teacher ratio, clinical education has contributed to the increased costs of law school).
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enrollment courses that are more cost-effective and that clinical
professors teach only small-enrollment courses. These
assumptions, however, do not always hold. The early law school
model of a few full-time faculty members with large teaching
loads, high student/faculty ratios, and high adjunct utilization is no
longer in effect at most law schools. However, the costs and
benefits of upper-level small enrollment courses or small seminars
developed around the research interests of tenured and tenure-track
faculty are rarely placed under cost-benefit scrutiny by those
making such arguments in reference to clinical legal education.132
Moreover, if law schools wanted to emphasize a client ready approach by
valuing those teachers who are most responsible for developing these traits
in law students, development offices could be tapped to fundraise for this
purpose.133
Further, some law schools (mostly land-grant law schools) have bucked
the high tuition trend, emphasizing clinical education while maintaining
affordable in-state tuition rates. A look at the country’s top clinical
programs, as ranked by U.S. News & World Report, reveals several
inexpensive schools.134 We have data that among these top twenty clinical
schools, most provide tenure or similar security of position for their clinical
faculty.135 It is safe to extrapolate that several of the inexpensive schools
with top notch clinical programs (CUNY, the University of Tennessee, the
University of New Mexico, and the University of the District of Columbia)
treat their clinical professors well. Thus, it is possible to produce affordable
law schools that value their skills teachers.
Finally, when we study the faculty structure at undergraduate
institutions, which do not have security of position regulations, we see that
there is no guarantee that a de-emphasis on tenure will in fact inure to the
benefit of students and reduce tuition costs. Thirty-five years ago, 75% of
all undergraduate positions were tenure-track positions, with 25% of the
teaching performed by contingent or adjunct teachers.136 Now, the
percentages have been reversed; only 25% of all undergraduate teachers are
in the tenure stream, whereas the remaining 75% of undergraduate teachers
132.
Adamson et al., supra note 75, at 397.
133.
Kirsten A. Dauphinais, Sea Change: The Seismic Shift in the Legal Profession and How Legal
Writing Professors Will Keep Legal Education Afloat in its Wake, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 49, 82-83
(2011).
134.
See Best Law Schools, Clinical Training, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2012), http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/clinical-trainingrankings.
135.
See Adamson et al., supra note 75, at 126 n.21.
136.
MARC BOUSQUET, HOW THE UNIVERSITY WORKS – HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LOW-WAGE
NATION 2 (NYU Press 2008).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366511

JEWEL, TALES OF A FOURTH TIER NOTHING (DO NOT DELETE)

150

The Journal of the Legal Profession

12/11/2013 2:58 PM

[Vol. 38:125

are employed on a contingent and temporary basis.137 A typical humanities
adjunct teacher with a Ph.D. is likely to teach four classes a semester (eight
a year) for $16,000 and no benefits.138 The trend toward contingent labor
in undergraduate education has inflicted collateral damage by “diminishing
the influence of the faculty by reducing the number of tenure-track jobs, the
role of faculty in governance, and the general prestige of the academy.” 139
Despite the money saved on faculty wages by casualizing the teaching
workforce, the money that undergraduate institutions saved by creating an
underclass of contingent teachers did not flow to the students and did not
result in lower tuition costs. As schools gradually replaced tenure-stream
teaching jobs with cheap adjunct labor, undergraduate tuition continued to
skyrocket well beyond the rate of inflation.140 Professor Tamanaha himself
presents statistics showing that in the past twenty-five years, tuition at
private universities has increased by 327%.141 Moreover, the cost savings
and benefits of “flexibility” have not been channeled into educational
programming or student support.142 “Full-time faculty are finding
themselves with heavier course loads, larger class sizes, diminishing ranks,
and, of course, constricted salaries.”143
One theory is that these cost savings are flowing to university
administrators and administrations in the form of “administrative bloat.”144
Universities appear to be “expanding the resources devoted to
administration significantly faster than spending on instruction, research
and service.”145 If American legal education were to become more
deregulated with tenure-track faculty becoming the minority and adjuncts
the norm, we could not guarantee that students rather than law school
administrators would be the beneficiaries. Without any clear guarantee that
this conservation of labor costs will benefit students, we should be hesitant
to introduce this oppressive work structure into legal education.

137.
Id. at 3.
138.
Id.
139.
Linda Ray Pratt, Disposable Faculty: Part-time Exploitation as Management Strategy, in WILL
TEACH FOR FOOD: ACADEMIC LABOR IN CRISIS 266 (Cary Nelson ed., 1997).
140.
BOUSQUET, supra note 136, at 4.
141.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 128-29. Statistics for tuition increases at public undergraduate
institutions are not available because of the difficulty in separating in-state from out-of-state tuition.
142.
Karen Thompson, Alchemy in the Academy: Moving Part-time Faculty from Piecework to
Parity, in WILL TEACH FOR FOOD: ACADEMIC LABOR IN CRISIS 288 (Cary Nelson ed., 1997).
143.
Id.
144.
BOUSQUET, supra note 136, at 6.
145.
Jay P. Greene, Administrative Bloat at American Universities: The Real Reason for High Costs
in
Higher
Education
(Goldwater
Institute
Research
Paper,
August
2010),
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/administrative-bloat-american-universities-real-reason-high-costshigher-education; see also Barbara R. Bergmann, Bloated Administration, Blighted Campuses, 77
ACADEME (Nov.-Dec. 1991) available at http://mtprof.msun.edu/Win1992/berg.html.
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Inexplicably, Professor Tamanaha holds up the community college
adjunct professor teaching ten courses a year as a possible model for the
future of law teaching.146 The work life of a non-tenurable community
college teacher is not a pleasant one; we are talking about a harried
teaching load of eight to ten classes a year at $2,000 per class and no
benefits.147 Like Wal-Mart employees, contingent academic workers must
often rely on other sources of income to make it, including “such forms of
public assistance as food stamps and unemployment compensation.”148
This system of cheap teaching does not “sort for the best teachers; it sorts
for persons who are in a financial position to accept compensation below
the living wage.”149 At the wealthier colleges, graduate students with
minimal pedagogical skills perform most of the teaching.150 When the
graduate students obtain their Ph.D., they often lose their authorization to
teach there, so as to make room for a new cohort of graduate student
teachers. The newly minted Ph.D.s then, if they are lucky, land a tenurestream job, but more likely than not end up teaching for near poverty wages
at community and junior colleges.151
Any policy aimed to effectuate a deeper casualization of the law
professoriate also raises the specter of gender discrimination. In the
undergraduate context, the mass casualization of undergraduate teaching
has closed the profession to people who rely on waged work to live.152
Often, the only persons who are able to take adjunct undergraduate
teaching jobs are those who do not need to work for a living, such as
individuals (usually women) with male spouses in the role of primary
breadwinner.153 Similarly, in the context of law school legal writing
courses, at least one law school has publicly disclosed its efforts to create a
“mommy-track” of female legal writing teachers with male spouse
breadwinners.154 The Dean celebrated the concept because the school
would only have to pay these women “a few thousand dollars per school
year.”155

146.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 45.
147.
BOUSQUET, supra note 136, at 3.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id. at 25.
151.
Id.
152.
BOUSQUET, supra note 136, at 43.
153.
Id. at 43-44.
154.
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist Critique of the Status
Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 467, 489-490 (2008) (citing Larry Smith, Tulane
Taps ‘Mommy-Track’ for Legal Writing and Research Instructors, 8 LAWYER HIRING AND TRAINING
REPORT 13 (August 1991)).
155.
Stanchi, supra note 154, at 489-90.
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In legal education, as with undergraduate education, the division
between the tenurable and non-tenurable teachers is a line of gender
segmentation. In the undergraduate professoriate, 40% of doctorates are
women, but women make up 58% of non-tenurable college instructors and
only 25% of senior professors.156 Although there are more tenure-track jobs
within legal education, we see similar gender segmentation in the law
professoriate. Relatively recent statistics show that only 23% of full law
professors are women, while women make up 67% of legal education’s
non-tenurable faculty157 and 70% of legal writing faculty.158 In writing
about the tenuous at-will position of most American legal writing faculty,
Professor Kathryn Stanchi points out that female professors have been
“channeled into work of low social reward, and whatever work women find
themselves doing is presumptively categorized as unimportant and
unskilled, and therefore appropriately unrewarded.”159 The same has
happened at the undergraduate level—”[t]he sectors in which women
outnumber men in the academy are uniformly the worst paid, frequently
involving lessened autonomy—as in writing instruction, where the largely
female staff is generally not rewarded for research, [and] usually excluded
from governance. . . .”160 Those who would remove tenure from law school
accreditation requirements and weaken the already weak protections in
place for non-tenure track clinical and legal writing faculty (those faculty
most aligned with preparing law students for the practice of law) should
engage with these equity issues.
Professor Tamanaha’s proposed burden of proof for evaluating a legal
education accreditation standard is off point. His perspective is that an
accreditation standard (such as job security for clinicians) can only be
justified if “law schools would not be able to produce competent lawyers”
without the standard.161 If this were the appropriate burden of proof for an
accreditation standard, then the entire ABA accreditation scheme could be
dispensed with (maybe this is what Professor Tamanaha desires) because
any single standard, standing alone, cannot be proven as necessary to
produce competent lawyers. A more appropriate inquiry is whether the
standard promotes “the goals of a sound program of legal education,
academic freedom, and a well-qualified faculty.”162 There is no question
156.
BOUSQUET, supra note 136, at 43.
157.
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: A Statistical Update, 73 UMKC L. REV.
419, 428 (2004).
158.
Stanchi, supra note 154, at 467.
159.
Id. at 474.
160.
BOUSQUET, supra note 136, at 44.
161.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 33.
162.
Peter R. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75
TENN. L. REV. 183, 228 (referencing SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM.
BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ACCREDITATION POLICY TASK FORCE 1, 17 (May 29, 2007)).
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that job security, faculty governance rights, and pay equity for skills faculty
will benefit students by incentivizing excellence in the teaching of practical
skills and sending the message that this aspect of their legal education is
valuable.
Moreover, as discussed above, teaching and scholarship are not
mutually exclusive pursuits, even for teachers who teach practical skills
courses. Rather, immersion in research and scholarship improves one’s
teaching, which in turn produces valuable pedagogical benefits for
students. Thus, a work structure system that rewards both teaching and
scholarship for all full-time faculty—no matter what they teach—creates
educational value. If there is a legitimate concern about deadweight and
incentivizing performance post-tenure, then there is an easy solution to
consider—rigorous post-tenure review for all faculty. A post-tenure review
process (every five years) for all professors would incentivize productivity
after tenure and make it easier to remove expensive deadwood from the
payrolls.
As discussed above, Professor Tamanaha’s proposed two-tier model
reinforces hierarchy within the legal profession by creating even more rigid
divisions between elite and non-elite lawyers. The argument against an
egalitarian standard for the law professoriate reproduces another arbitrary
hierarchy, this time within legal education, by protecting the status and
privilege (tenure, pay, and a say in faculty governance) of the traditional
casebook professor at the expense of skills professors. This hierarchy exists
“without reasonable and adequate justification.”163 When tenured law
professors argue against granting tenure to non-traditional law faculty, such
as clinical and legal writing professors, cost and deadweight could be
pretexts for what is really going on—status closure, a sociological
phenomenon where privileged members of a group exclude others from
entry into the group.164
That the law professors most invested in the teaching of valuable
practical skills are treated as second- and third-class citizens has not
received nearly enough attention in the legal education reformist literature.
When skills teaching is mentioned in the same breath as the crisis in legal
education, the argument is that a greater emphasis on skills training costs
too much money and is of limited pedagogical value because “[t]he best
way to learn how to practice law is to actually do it,”165 or in a different

163.
Adamson et al., supra note 75, at 384.
164.
See, e.g., Stanchi, supra note 154, at 467-68 (describing the marginalization of legal writing
faculty as a status closure mechanism); see also Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal
Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV.
1155, 1169 (2008) (describing educational credentials as a status closure mechanism).
165.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 172. Professor Tamanaha then argues that clinical programs, as
costly “artificial practice settings” are inferior to actual practice settings. See id. at 173.
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variation, by the time one gets to law school, “you can write well or you
can’t.”166 But those of us who have labored in the trenches teaching skills
know this view is fallacious. Becoming an expert practitioner is a process,
and while students come through the law school door with differing
abilities, no one is an expert legal practitioner from day one. Skills can and
should be taught in a safe environment without the threat of a malpractice
lawsuit or an ethics complaint.
We are at a point in time where we can generate collective responses to
the crisis in the legal profession and in legal education—responses that
recognize that legal education is a public good. We should take this
opportunity to make the structure of our professoriate more egalitarian,
recognizing that the different roles we play in the education of our students
have equal value. A commitment to equal protection for law professors
reflects the aspirational ideals that we would impose on the rest of the
profession and the rest of society. There is no good reason to avoid this
route.
IV. NON-ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR ATTENDING LAW SCHOOLS
Professor Tamanaha’s criticism of legal education’s value is
relentlessly economic—the cost of law school is too high in light of law
graduates’ actual job prospects.167 And, any person who “irrationally”
chooses to attend an expensive low-tier law school must be the victim of
the optimism bias heuristic.168
With law school admissions numbers on a steep decline,169 it appears
that we are now in the midst of a much-needed market correction, with
many would-be law students, evaluating the costs and risks, choosing to
forego law school. But the question remains as to why some, even with
better information about expected outcomes in legal education, still choose
to attend law school? And, in thinking about reforms, such as limiting the
amount of debt a student can borrow170 or capping the amount of federal

166.
Paul Campos, What Law Schools Accomplish, We’re Talking About Practice, INSIDE THE LAW
SCHOOL SCAM (Aug. 29, 2011; 7:13 AM),
http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2011/08/what-law-schools-accomplish-were.html.
167.
See generally, TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 138. Professor Tamanaha’s perspective is not out
of line with that of most attorneys, who tend to recognize financial implications but fail to recognize
other competing values that impact a decision to do one thing or another. See, e.g., COCHRAN, supra
note 35, at 176.
168.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 143-44.
169.
Karen Sloan, Avoiding Law School in Droves, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202585810784&Avoiding_law_school_in_droves_
_.
170.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 179-80.
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debt on a per-school basis,171 should we, as elite gatekeepers of the
profession, paternalistically impose our economically oriented riskaversion scales on those who would try to join our profession?
What is the value of the J.D., given troubling tuition costs, employment
numbers, and starting salaries? For purposes of this argument, let’s
consider a J.D. from a low-tier school, which can be expected to have the
worst rate of return for its graduates. These decisions cannot be explained
away by behavioral economics theories (such as optimism bias). I am also
concerned with the strains of elitism running through the legal education
reform debate (get ready to close your doors, lowly fourth-tier law schools)
and the idea that elite law professors, accumulating their own cultural
capital as they write and blog their way to more prominence, are the expert
arbiters on whether law school is a good investment. None of this is meant
to discount the deeply compelling economic arguments as to why one
should not attend law school. Nor is this inquiry meant to dismiss the
reprehensible way that law schools have obfuscated their job statistics in
order to market the value of their programs of education.172 But I am
curious to explore the non-economic rationales for why someone would
choose to attend law school, with the costs and risks fully disclosed.
One thing to consider is cultural capital,173 i.e., the non-economic value
that a law degree affords. Social mobility has long been associated with
obtaining a law degree, and obviously, the argument that a law degree will
help one move up in society’s structure is a difficult one to make, given the
financial hole one must dig in order to obtain the degree. But there is more
to the story of social mobility than just economics. Some law students, as
the first in their family to obtain a J.D., may see the opportunity to practice
law as an important cultural marker in their community. The cultural cache
of a law degree might mean something, even if the newly minted J.D. can
only find full-time work in a non-legal job and must enter the profession
via a part-time solo practice.
I only have anecdotal evidence to support this theory; it derives mostly
from listening to my former students who are struggling to make their way
economically in the profession but who are nonetheless ecstatic to have the
J.D. and the power that it signifies within their communities and families.
These are students with relatively low merit indicators (LSAT

171.
Id. at 180. This will hurt the non-elite schools, which do not have extensive endowments to
provide scholarships and grant-based tuition assistance to their students.
172.
See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 71-74.
173.
See, e.g., DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU 52
(Univ. of Chicago 1997); see also ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND
FAMILY LIFE 361-62 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS]. Cultural capital refers to the
possession and use of things like verbal ability, cultural awareness, institutional knowledge, and
credentials to maneuver through institutions in the social world.
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scores/undergraduate GPAs), and but for the opportunity afforded by
lower-tier law schools, these students would not get the chance to enter the
legal profession. Every graduation, when I see the beaming smiles from
my students’ family members, I do not think about the fact that they are
getting a degree from a so-called fourth-tier toilet174 law school; I see
people who have achieved a dream (albeit at great financial expense) and
obtained a credential that signifies membership in a powerful profession.
Even for low-status members of the profession, there is still power, because
all attorneys are vested with the ability to bring the power of the state to
bear (even if this means filing a small claims lawsuit or negotiating a
personal injury claim with an insurance company). That the symbolic value
of the credential does not convert to a purely economic value is irrelevant
in this equation.
Cultural capital also has to do with accumulation of helpful knowledge
of how institutions work and how power moves on a micro-level.175 I do
not think the argument that a law degree provides one with an “intrinsic
value of education in personal, intellectual, spiritual, and emotional
growth”176 is the best way to evaluate the non-economic benefits of a law
degree. Rather, a law degree provides the recipient with value in knowing
a little bit more about how the world works and how to obtain benefits in
an institutional setting (such as a courtroom, business negotiation, or
school). This type of cultural capital creates small-scale benefits that add
up and can also be transmitted to one’s children.177 Therefore, the cultural
capital encapsulated in a law degree can and does connect with social
mobility, even though it may not directly connect with economic wealth.
Meaningful autonomy is another reason I can think of as to why
someone would take a huge risk to obtain a J.D. with little guarantee of job
security in return. Practicing law, even if it is only part-time and includes
tasks that have long been designated as unchallenging and low-level (e.g.,
drafting wills, preparing bankruptcy petitions, family law, and criminal
174.
See Lucille A. Jewel, You’re Doing It Wrong: How the Anti-Law School Scam Blogging
Movement Can Shape the Legal Profession, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 239, 266 (2011).
175.
See, e.g., Annette Lareau & Erin McNamara Horvat, Moments of Social Inclusion and
Exclusion: Race, Class, and Cultural Capital in Family-School Relationships, 72 SOC. OF EDUC. 37, 42
(1999); Annette Lareau & Elliot B. Weininger, Cultural Capital in Educational Research: A Critical
Assessment, 32 THEORY AND SOCIETY, 567, 569 (2003) (defining cultural capital); see also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 216 (Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)
(Instead of a single sovereign controlling power in a top-down fashion, in modern Western society,
power is created on a micro-level through “an infinitesimal distribution of power relations.”).
176.
TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 137 (quoting Paul Berman, Thinking about Law School Tuition,
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DEAN OF THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, August
30, 2011, http://web.archive.org/web/20120426233539/http://20thandh.org/2011/08/30/thinking-aboutlaw-school-tuition/).
177.
For instance, children reared by parents possessing cultural capital are skilled at deploying
their cultural capital and signaling a specific kind of interpersonal moxie that works in professional and
business settings. See, e.g., UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS, supra note 173, at 1-7.
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defense), still requires the outlay of substantive knowledge, rhetorical skill,
and counseling ability as the attorney seeks to help others maneuver
through the legal system.
As professors, we should not impose our hyper-snobbery on the rest of
the world. For all the professional elitism about rank of law school and
type of law practice, most lay people, especially in underserved
communities, view being a lawyer as being a lawyer. It doesn’t matter
what school one graduated from or what type of law one practices.
Professors Dinovitzer and Garth have reported career satisfaction rates
among lawyers who graduate from the least elite schools (who are more
likely to represent individual clients) remain higher than those legal
professionals that graduate from elite schools (who are more likely to land
a corporate law firm job).178 The authors then posit that these differential
outcomes in lawyer satisfaction are structurally deterministic
manifestations of how our professional hierarchy replicates itself.179 As
much as I respect the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu,180 denying
that these young lawyers have agency in constructing their work
expectations and attitudes causes me some concern. Regardless of the
theoretical reasons for why graduates of fourth-tier law schools report the
highest satisfaction rates, the data on lawyer satisfaction should give law
professors pause before we project our own values and risk-aversion scales
on everyone else who contemplates a career in law.
Why do people make seemingly irrational economic choices? Why,
for instance, do throngs of people move to New York City to be musicians,
writers, or actors when NYC is hardly an incubator of financial security or
success in these endeavors? Yes, we must accept that job security is no
longer a reason for obtaining a law degree. In addition, the argument that
“one can do anything with a law degree” does not work these days (if it
ever did). Law schools will not likely continue to draw 40,000-plus new
law students into their classrooms each year, but my predication is that the
J.D. will continue to retain some cultural value that defies pure economic
reason.

178.
Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of Structuring Legal
Careers, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 12, 30-43 (2007).
179.
See id. at 41-43.
180.
See SWARTZ, supra note 173.
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CONCLUSION
Professor Tamanaha’s book is laudable for its coverage of the systemic
problems that face legal education today. But I do think that this analysis
misses the point in a few places, particularly where he accepts dichotomies
that do not necessarily make sense (the binary opposition between practical
teaching and scholarship) and promotes policy choices (a two-tier system
of legal education and erosion of job security protections) that will further
entrench harmful hierarchies in our profession with no proven benefit to the
students.
The crisis within legal education affords us an opportunity to improve
legal education and make it less hierarchical, less elite, and more
egalitarian. Some of Professor Tamanaha’s suggestions would
unfortunately make our profession even more hierarchical than it already is.
Hierarchy and elitism in the legal profession should not be shrugged off as
the product of the natural order of things; rather, hierarchy and elitism
should be targets of legal education reform because they produce negative
outcomes. For instance, an elitist hierarchy has negatively impacted the
production of law in the federal circuit courts of appeals.181 In this system,
civil rights cases, employee discrimination cases, pro se cases, and prisoner
appeals are given low priority and shunted down to staff attorneys who
dispense with justice in short unpublished opinions.182 Circuit court judges
then give the more “interesting” civil cases (usually involving corporate
and commercial disputes) the full “Learned Hand” treatment, listening to
oral arguments, reading the briefs, and writing lengthy deliberative
opinions on the merits.183 We have in this system a very different type of
justice being offered to citizens based on the type of case they present to
the court.
Elite hierarchies also breed status differentiation, which in turn has the
potential to incentivize unethical behavior.184 The status differentiation
explanation for unethical behavior posits that:
[S]tatus differentiation in organizations creates social isolation. As
a result, . . . [a] high status group identity dominates, and . . . [a]
moral identity is suppressed. The high status group identity results
in insensitivity to the needs of out-group members . . . ,

181.
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275-76 (1996); Penelope Pether,
Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1, 13-14 (2007).
182.
Pether, supra note 181, at 11-12.
183.
Id. at 24.
184.
Galperin et al., supra note 38, at 407-08.
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consequently resulting in decreased motivation to self-regulate
ethical decision making.185
Too much social isolation within the legal profession could strengthen a
class of elite lawyers who are simply too caught up in their high-status
social identity to trifle with the concerns of anyone else. If these attorneys
are (and they likely will be) in positions to make decisions that impact
ordinary folks, we will continue to see self-interested decisions that
privilege the needs of the powerful at the expense of the weak.186 The
social isolation of elite law professors might also cause them to teach and
theorize with blinders on, and their intellectual weight could influence the
law in negative ways.187 We really should not have to argue why elitist
hierarchies are bad; they are, after all, profoundly undemocratic.
Legal education must be reformed. But my suggestion is that we look
for ways to make it better as well as cheaper.

185.
Id. at 408.
186.
Id. at 407. The authors formulated their theory to explain why corporate executives engaged in
the practice of “cutting jobs, pay, or pensions for rank and file employees with one hand, while
accepting bonuses and fantastic perquisites for themselves with the other” Id.
187.
See Daniel Martin Katz et al., Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social Network Analysis of the
American Law Professoriate, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76, 77 (2011) (arguing that elite law professors have
contributed to “the spread and/or survival of historically questionable legal narratives”).
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